Correction in Example 3 of Banerjee, Kaniel and Kremer (2009) - Price Drift as an Outcome of Differences in Higher-Order Beliefs

For Example 3 in the paper, there is an error in the calculation on page 3718 when BKK write\textsuperscript{1}
\[ \mathbb{E}_{t+1}[P_2] = \frac{1}{4} (S_i + U) - \frac{\gamma}{2} b \left( P_1 - \frac{a}{2} (S_i + U_i) \right) = \frac{1}{4} (S_i + U) - \frac{\gamma}{2} Z_1. \] (1)

Specifically, since investor \( i \) cannot directly observe \( Z_1 \), the second equality does not hold, and so we cannot plug it in when calculating the expectation \( \mathbb{E}[P_2 - \mathbb{E}_1 [P_2] | P_1 - P_0] \). As a result, in this example, when aggregate supply follows a random walk, prices do not exhibit drift.

However, the non-existence of drift in this example is a consequence of the assumption that aggregate supply shocks follow a random walk i.e., \( Z_{t+1} = Z_t + z_{t+1} \). In particular, we show below, that when we allow for general persistence in supply shocks i.e., \( Z_{t+1} = \alpha Z_t + z_{t+1} \), then prices exhibit drift in Example 3 when \( \alpha < 1 \) and \( \Sigma_z \) is sufficiently small.

Our motivation for assuming a random walk was technical: when \( \alpha < 1 \), prices in the rational expectations benchmark mechanically exhibit reversals. We were hoping to convey the intuition for our results more clearly by shutting this down, but this ended up making the analysis too special. However, we believe our underlying economic intuition is sound.

To gain some intuition, it is useful to reconsider the expressions for prices in our economy:

\[ P_2 = \bar{\mathbb{E}} [V] - \gamma \Sigma_V Z_2, \text{ and} \] (2)
\[ P_1 = (\Sigma_V^{-1} + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1})^{-1} \left\{ \Sigma_V^{-1} \bar{\mathbb{E}} [V] + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \mathbb{E}_1 [P_2] - \gamma Z_1 \right\} \] (3)
\[ = (\Sigma_V^{-1} + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1})^{-1} \left\{ \Sigma_V^{-1} P_2 + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \mathbb{E}_1 [P_2] + \gamma (Z_2 - Z_1) \right\} \] (4)

This implies that
\[ P_2 - P_1 = (\Sigma_V^{-1} + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1})^{-1} \left\{ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \left( P_2 - \mathbb{E}_1 [P_2] \right) - \gamma (Z_2 - Z_1) \right\} \] (5)

and so
\[ \mathbb{E} [P_2 - P_1 | P_1 - P_0] \propto \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \left( P_2 - \mathbb{E}_1 [P_2] \right) + \gamma (Z_1 - Z_2) \right] | P_1 - P_0 \]. (6)

- First note that if \( Z_t \) is constant, then the above expression simplifies to
\[ \mathbb{E} [P_2 - P_1 | P_1 - P_0] \propto \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \Sigma_V \Sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-1} \left( \bar{S} - \mathbb{E}_1 [\bar{S}] \right) \right] | P_1 - P_0 \]. (7)

\textsuperscript{1}We thank Albert “Pete” Kyle and Yajun Wang for bringing this to our attention.
since \( \mathbb{E} [V] = \Sigma \Sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-1} \bar{S} \). This implies we have drift if and only if

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) \right] | P_1 - P_0 = \kappa (P_1 - P_0)
\]  

(8)

for some \( \kappa > 0 \). While the assumption of no noise may be problematic for rational expectations equilibria, it is natural in a setting with differences of opinion and highlights our intuition result cleanly.

- If \( Z_t \) are i.i.d., then

\[
\mathbb{E} [P_2 - P_1 | P_1 - P_0] \propto \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \Sigma V \Sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-1} (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) + \gamma Z_1 | P_1 - P_0 \right].
\]  

(9)

In this case, when \( \Sigma_Z \to 0 \), we have \( \mathbb{E} [\gamma Z_1 | P_1 - P_0] \to 0 \), and so once again, prices exhibit drift if and only if

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) \right] | P_1 - P_0 = \kappa (P_1 - P_0)
\]  

(10)

for some positive \( \kappa \).

More generally, when \( Z_{t+1} = \alpha Z_t + z_{t+1} \), we can show that

\[
\mathbb{E} [P_2 - P_1 | P_1 - P_0] \propto \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \left( P_2 - \bar{E}_1 [P_2] \right) + \gamma (Z_1 - Z_2) | P_1 - P_0 \right]
\]  

(11)

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \left( \mathbb{E} [V] - \gamma \Sigma V Z_2 - \bar{E}_1 [\mathbb{E} [V] - \gamma \Sigma V Z_2] \right) + \gamma (1 - \alpha) Z_1 \right] | P_1 - P_0
\]  

(12)

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \Sigma V \left\{ \Sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-1} (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) - \gamma \alpha (Z_1 - \bar{E}_1 [Z_1]) \right\} + \gamma (1 - \alpha) Z_1 \right] | P_1 - P_0
\]  

(13)

Since \( P_1 \) provides information about \( \bar{S} \) and \( Z_1 \), differences of opinion have offsetting effects on the \( (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) \) and \( (Z_1 - \bar{E}_1 [Z_1]) \) errors. In the example, \( \alpha = 1 \) and these effects exactly offset each other, which leads to no price drift. However, as the next section illustrates, when \( \alpha < 1 \), the two effects do not offset perfectly, and so one can generate drift when \( \Sigma_Z \to 0 \). Specifically, the above expression highlights that when \( \alpha \) and \( \Sigma_{\varepsilon} \) are sufficiently small, then prices exhibit drift iff

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\bar{S} - \bar{E}_1 [\bar{S}]) \right] | P_1 - P_0 = \kappa (P_1 - P_0)
\]  

(14)

for some positive \( \kappa \). As such, we believe that the underlying economic intuition for our results are sound.
Example 3 with Generalized Persistence

In the example, $V \sim N(0, 1/\tau_V)$, $\varepsilon_i \sim N(0, 1/\tau_\varepsilon)$. Suppose the aggregate supply of the asset be given by $Z_1$ and $Z_2 = \alpha Z_1 + z_2$, where $Z_1, z_2 \sim N(0, 1/\tau_z)$ and independent of each other and $V$ and $\varepsilon_i$. In this example, $\tau_V = \tau_\varepsilon = 1$. Let $\bar{S} \equiv \int_i S_i di$. The objective distribution of $\bar{S} = V$, but according to investor $i$’s interpretation, we have

$$\bar{S} \equiv_i \frac{1}{2} (S_i + U_i). \quad (15)$$

**Date 2 price.** At time 2, the conditional expectations are

$$E_{i,1}[V] = \frac{\tau_\varepsilon}{\tau_V + \tau_\varepsilon} S_i = \frac{1}{2} S_i, \quad \Sigma_V \equiv \text{var}_{i,1}[V] = \frac{1}{\tau_V + \tau_\varepsilon} = \frac{1}{2}. \quad (16)$$

Market clearing at date 1 implies that

$$P_2 = \int_i E_{i,1}[V] di - \gamma \Sigma_V Z_2 \quad (17)$$

$$= \frac{\tau_\varepsilon}{\tau_V + \tau_\varepsilon} \bar{S} - \gamma \Sigma_V Z_2 \quad (18)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \bar{S} - \frac{\gamma}{2} Z_2. \quad (19)$$

The objective distribution of the price is

$$P_2 = \frac{1}{2} V - \frac{\gamma}{2} Z_2, \quad (20)$$

while investor $i$’s subjective beliefs about the date 2 price is

$$P_2 =_i \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} (S_i + U_i) \right) - \frac{\gamma}{2} Z_2. \quad (21)$$

**Date 1 price.** Conjecture that the date 1 price is of the form

$$P_1 = a\bar{S} + bZ_1. \quad (22)$$

According to investor $i$, this has a distribution

$$P_1 =_i a \left( \frac{1}{2} (S_i + U_i) \right) + bZ_1. \quad (23)$$
Note. Investor $i$ observes $U_i, S_i$ and $P_1$. This implies:

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,1} [\bar{S}|U_i, S_i, P_1] = \frac{1}{2} (S_i + U_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,1} [Z_1|U_i, S_i, P_1] = \frac{1}{b} \left( P_1 - a \mathbb{E}_{i,1} [\bar{S}|U_i, S_i, P_1] \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

$$= \frac{1}{b} \left( P_1 - \frac{a}{2} (S_i + U_i) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

Note. In the paper, BKK incorrectly plug in $Z_1$ for this.

The above expressions imply

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,1} [P_2|U_i, S_i, P_1] = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_{i,1} [\bar{S}|U_i, S_i, P_1] - \frac{\gamma}{2} \alpha \mathbb{E}_{i,1} [Z_1|U_i, S_i, P_1]$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

$$= \frac{1}{4} (S_i + U_i) - \frac{\alpha \gamma}{2} \left( \frac{1}{b} \left( P_1 - \frac{a}{2} (S_i + U_i) \right) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)

and

$$\text{var}_{i,1} [P_2|U_i, S_i, P_1] = \Sigma_{P_2} = \frac{1}{4} \frac{\gamma^2}{\tau_z}. \hspace{1cm} (29)$$

This implies

$$\bar{E}_1 [P_2] = \frac{1}{4} \bar{S} - \frac{\alpha \gamma}{2} \left( \frac{1}{b} \left( P_1 - \frac{a}{2} (S) \right) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

and so

$$P_1 = \frac{\Sigma_{\bar{V}}^{-1} \bar{E}_1 [V] + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1} \bar{E}_1 [P_2] - \gamma Z_1}{\Sigma_{\bar{V}}^{-1} + \Sigma_{P_2}^{-1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

$$= \bar{S} \left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha \gamma \tau_z + b \tau_z}{2 b \gamma^2 + 4 b \tau_z} \right) - \frac{(\gamma^3 + 2 \alpha \gamma \tau_z)}{2 \gamma^2 + 4 \tau_z} Z_1$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

This implies the price coefficients $a$ and $b$ can be solved for using the system of two equations:

$$a = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha \gamma \tau_z + b \tau_z}{2 b \gamma^2 + 4 b \tau_z}, \quad b = -\frac{(\gamma^3 + 2 \alpha \gamma \tau_z)}{2 \gamma^2 + 4 \tau_z}$$  \hspace{1cm} (33)

which implies the solution is:

$$a = \frac{\gamma^2 + \tau_z}{2 (\gamma^2 + 2 \tau_z) (\gamma^2 + \alpha \tau_z)}, \quad b = -\frac{(\gamma^3 + 2 \alpha \gamma \tau_z)}{2 (\gamma^2 + 2 \tau_z)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (34)

- Note that for the special case of random walk (as in the paper) $\alpha = 1$, and the above reduce to

$$a = \frac{1}{2}, \quad b = -\frac{\gamma}{2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (35)
• For the other extreme of i.i.d. aggregate supply shocks (i.e., $\alpha = 0$), the above reduce to

\[ a = \frac{\gamma^2 + \tau_z}{2(\gamma^2 + 2\tau_z)}, \quad b = -\frac{\gamma^3}{2(\gamma^2 + 2\tau_z)}. \]  

(36)

To summarize,

\[ P_2 = \frac{1}{2}S - \frac{\gamma}{2}Z_2 \]  

(37)

\[ P_1 = aS + bZ_1, \]  

(38)

where

\[ a = \frac{(\gamma^2 + \tau_z)(\gamma^2 + 2\alpha\tau_z)}{2(\gamma^2 + 2\tau_z)(\gamma^2 + \alpha\tau_z)}, \quad b = -\frac{\gamma^3 + 2\alpha\gamma\tau_z}{2(\gamma^2 + 2\tau_z)}. \]  

(39)

Now,

\[ \mathbb{E}[P_2 - P_1|P_1 - P_0] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( \frac{1}{2} - a \right) \bar{S} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \bar{Z}_2 - \left( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{2} + b \right) Z_1|P_1 - P_0 \right] \]  

(40)

\[ \propto \text{cov} \left( \left( \frac{1}{2} - a \right) \bar{S} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \bar{Z}_2 - \left( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{2} + b \right) Z_1, a\bar{S} + bZ_1 \right) \]  

(41)

\[ = \left( \frac{1}{2} - a \right) \text{avar} (\bar{S}) - \left( \frac{\alpha \gamma}{2} + b \right) \text{bvar} (Z_1) \equiv \rho \]  

(42)

Note that there is price drift iff $\rho > 0$, since

\[ \mathbb{E}[P_2 - P_1|P_1 - P_0] = \frac{\rho}{\text{var}[P_1 - P_0]} (P_1 - P_0). \]  

(43)

• Note that when $\alpha = 1$, the above implies $\rho = 0$. This is the result in your note.

• When $\alpha = 0$, we have

\[ \rho = \frac{\tau_z^3 + \gamma^2 \tau_z^2 - \gamma^6}{4\tau_z (\gamma^2 + 2\tau_z)^2} \]  

(44)

which implies that $\rho > 0$ when $\tau_z$ is sufficiently large.

• More generally, we can show that $\rho > 0$ iff $\tau_z$ is sufficiently large. One can show that asufficient condition is $\tau_z > 2\gamma^2$.

The Figure highlights that when $\alpha < 1$ and $\tau_z$ is sufficiently large, prices exhibit drift.
Figure 1: A plot of $\rho$ vs. $\alpha$

Other parameters are $\tau_V = \tau_e = \gamma = 1$. 